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 The Pacific Forum CSIS, with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and with support 
from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), held a US-ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence 
Trilateral Dialogue on July 19-21, 2015. Forty-one US, ROK, and Japanese experts, officials, 
military officers, and observers, along with 19 Pacific Forum Young Leaders, attended in their 
private capacities. Key findings include: 
 
 The primary challenges that the United States faces from its chief competitors in 
Northeast Asia – China and North Korea – are similar. Each is trying to use speed, geography, 
and asymmetry of stakes to reach their objectives, while avoiding a US military response. 
 
 All participants support increased trilateral cooperation but understand that political 
dynamics between Seoul and Tokyo will limit progress. One ROK participant insisted that 
political support for trilateralism in South Korea is only possible if the three countries focus on 
countering a North Korean threat. “China is the ceiling to how far trilateral cooperation can go,” 
an argument consistent with previous meetings. A US participant argued that trilateral 
cooperation and coordination is not sufficient. He called for greater interoperability that leads to 
deep integration of security policies.  
 
 South Korea and Japan remain concerned with gray zone challenges from North Korea 
and China respectively and want more clarity about how the United States will contribute to their 
defense in these situations. Some US participants noted that the US can only do so much to help 
allies to counter provocations. Others encouraged more seamless integration of planning and 
greater US support for allied efforts to protect their interests if challenged. Some US participants, 
however, stressed that allies are primarily responsible for their own defense against gray zone 
challenges.  
 
 ROK participants remain concerned about Japan’s move toward collective self-defense 
(CSD).  They recognize that Japan could play an important role in the Asia-Pacific, but want 
assurances that Japan will not be involved in a Korean Peninsula contingency without prior 
approval from Seoul. 
 
 Japanese participants heard the ROK message and provided assurances that no action 
would occur in a Korean contingency without Seoul’s consent. They supported CSD and the new 
US-Japan defense guidelines, while emphasizing the limitations of each.  
 
 With its new security legislation, Japan faces assurance problems similar to those the US 
has addressed with its allies: Regional countries, especially South Korea, want more detail about 
the circumstances in which CSD will be exercised. Japanese participants countered that 
ambiguity is inevitable as not all contingencies can be anticipated.  
 
 An ROK participant proposed a trilateral strategic deterrence committee to coordinate 
nuclear plans and policies in an effort to show joint nuclear resolve.  
 
The conference featured a tabletop exercise in which teams representing the US, Japan, and 
South Korea responded to a crisis. In the first move, North Korea invaded and overran Daechong 
Island, taking hostages and seizing control of the island. In move two, the DPRK responded to 
ROK threats of retaliation by insisting that it plans to keep Daechong, demanding that Seoul 
 vi 
abandon a neighboring island, Baengnyeongdo, renewing its commitment to redraw the Northern 
Limit Line, dispersing road mobile missiles, and issuing thinly-veiled weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) threats against the ROK and Japan. In an interjection during deliberations, it 
was revealed that North Korea detonated a nuclear device over the Sea of Japan. 
 
Areas of convergence 
 Participants from all three countries were unsure of North Korean goals and objectives in 
the scenario, but thought that they were likely limited, perhaps to achieve territorial gain 
or to demonstrate strength to a domestic audience. 
 US and South Korean participants were determined to respond to North Korea’s 
aggression decisively, including rolling back territorial gains, recovering hostages, and 
punishing Pyongyang for its provocation. Participants from each country did, however, 
recognize the potential for escalation after the US/ROK response. 
 South Korean participants proposed a unilateral ROK military response to retake the 
island, strike North Korean military bases that had supported the initial invasion, and 
additional escalatory steps. They expressed a strong sense that, after five years of North 
Korean provocations, Seoul is itching to strike back at North Korea decisively (and 
disproportionately). 
 Initially worried that the United States might try to restrain their military action, South 
Korea participants were surprised at the extent of US support for decisive military action.  
 Japanese participants supported the parameters of the US and ROK response and offered 
support. They also expressed concern with overreaction and escalation, particularly if it 
might spillover and affect Japan, and hoped to be consulted as response options were 
developed and pursued. 
 After the second move, all three teams supported a decisive military response to include 
retaking the lost island and conventional strikes in North Korea. The ROK team thought 
the situation was quickly moving from a limited provocation toward a full-scale war and 
it needed to prepare for inevitable escalation. They also proposed that eliminating the 
North Korean nuclear threat be the top priority.  
 
Areas of disagreement 
 While generally supportive of South Korea’s actions, US participants expected that Seoul 
would pursue greater consultation and coordination with Washington and Combined 
Forces Command if such a crisis arose. Many argued that North Korean invasion of an 
island would be an act of war that should initiate the transfer of operational control to the 
United States. 
 Areas of potential disagreement between Japan and the ROK arose during the first move. 
First, the Japan team was more concerned with escalation than the ROK team. Second, 
the Japanese proposed preparing for non-combatant evacuation operations, while the 
ROK side cautioned against such a step, arguing that it would induce panic. Third, the 
Japan team proposed taking the issue to the UNSC, while the South Korean team 
supported an initial unilateral response. 
 In move two, Japan cautioned that it would support a tactical response but not full-scale 
war, all-out invasion, or regime change. The team again expressed a desire to be 
consulted before the US and ROK decided on a response. The US team also hoped that 
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the ROK would not, at this point, establish regime change as its military objective, which 
caused some consternation among Korean participants.  
 
Nuclear signaling 
 ROK participants expected that, in this type of scenario, North Korea would be likely to 
issue nuclear threats early in the crisis. They requested that the United States show 
nuclear resolve. While they did not express a clear preference for a mechanism of doing 
so, the deployment of nuclear-capable assets to Guam was seen as a desirable initial step. 
 The ROK team said that North Korea’s detonation of a nuclear weapon changed their 
discussions. This showed them that North Korea was willing to escalate all the way. The 
US team also saw use of nuclear weapons as a game changer and argued that it changed 
the US interests at stake.  
 Japan, however, saw the nuclear detonation as an attempt at coercion, not an indication 
that North Korea was preparing to use additional nuclear weapons. They noted that North 
Korea’s overriding interest in regime survival would prevent it from using nuclear 
weapons against a population center. 
 Use of a nuclear device did not surprise US, ROK, and Japanese participants, all of whom 
seemed to have accepted that nuclear use was a real possibility, although most (but not 
all) thought it would initially be limited to a warning shot or signaling as opposed to an 
attack on troops or population centers.  
 A Korean participant argued that if North Korea was able to hold on to the island by 




 It is essential that the three countries agree on what constitutes North Korean de-
escalation (or what would constitute “offramps” for the crisis). Participants reached no 
consensus on what Pyongyang could/should do to defuse the crisis that would satisfy 
their need to punish North Korea for its aggression.  
 When the US and ROK speak of escalation they use different contexts: Americans speak 
of escalation in the context of nuclear use, Koreans are talking about escalation of aims – 
i.e., unification. 
 
China’s role  
 Participants from the US, South Korea, and Japan all acknowledged that China would 
play a critical role in this type of crisis. For some, China would be unlikely to offer 
support and may even side with North Korea; others saw an opportunity to distance 
Beijing from Pyongyang.  
 ROK thinking about China was inconsistent. On one hand, ROK participants argued for 
taking Chinese sensitivities into account when considering action in Northeast Asia to 
maintain leverage with Beijing to deal with Pyongyang. Yet, in the scenario, the ROK 
side wanted to act before the UNSC could take up the issue for fear that China would 




 The ROK team noted that the ROK would need time for full-scale mobilization and 
proposed an operational pause. US participants were skeptical that North Korea would 
allow this to occur unchallenged. 
 A Japanese participant highlighted the absence of established channels through which the 
SDF could communicate with Korea in a crisis. Any communications would be ad hoc 
and indirect.  
 The exercise highlighted the difficulty of effectively managing a North Korean initiated 
crisis. Several participants wondered whether it would be possible for the US, ROK, and 




























 The need to ensure that the US extended deterrent in Northeast Asia remains 
credible and effective has never been more pressing; the obstacles to doing so have never 
been higher. North Korea’s increasingly capable nuclear program, combined with the 
unpredictability of Kim Jong Un, demands that the United States, South Korea, and Japan 
closely coordinate – and deeply integrate – their thinking and policies. A more powerful 
and assertive China is challenging the institutions and norms that gird the regional order; 
again, coordinated trilateral responses are one of the most effective weapons Washington, 
Seoul, and Tokyo have to strengthen security. Well-known political issues inhibit 
trilateral cooperation, but there are other equally powerful and less well understood 
forces that impede the efforts of the three countries to work together to check regional 
threats. 
 
 For nearly a decade, the Pacific Forum CSIS has probed the seams and the 
substance of extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. This effort began with bilateral 
programs and has evolved into a groundbreaking trilateral dialogue that offers, in the 
words of one well-traveled Korean participant, “a rare chance for frank and 
straightforward remarks.” In 2015,  this track 1.5 discussion involved 41 US, ROK, and 
Japanese experts, officials, military officers, and observers, along with 19 Pacific Forum 
Young Leaders (all attending in their private capacities), who addressed concerns about 
the capacity of the three countries to sustain and strengthen their deterrent in the face of 
new and enduring challenges. Partnership with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and 
support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), ensured that the US-ROK-
Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue built upon previous meetings to clarify 
misunderstandings and misperceptions and to identify ways to ensure that the US 
extended deterrent remains credible and effective – to ally and adversary alike. 
 
Comparative Security Perspectives 
 
 The foundation of effective trilateral cooperation and credible deterrence is a 
shared assessment of regional security challenges. Fortunately, the perspectives of the 
three countries largely converge. All presenters agreed that the North Korean threat is 
ever more complex, with traditional capabilities being enhanced and evolving and 
expanding to encompass new dimensions.  Dangers include not only the threats of 
missiles, nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction), and cyber attacks, 
but those triggered by weakness, too: regime instability or an accident within North 
Korea could create large numbers of refugees that could prove extremely destabilizing. 
While questions persist about the extent of North Korean capabilities – can they put a 
nuclear warhead on a missile? Can they reach the continental United States? – all three 
governments assume that the threats are real and plan accordingly. The success of the 
byungin policy (dual development of the military and the economy) means that dangers 
will grow over time as Pyongyang avoids the choice of butter or guns. 
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 There was similar agreement that China’s rise is equally problematic. Beijing is 
not only becoming more assertive and aggressive, but it is playing an increasingly 
sophisticated diplomatic game, pushing a vision of regional architecture that challenges 
existing institutions and could undermine prevailing norms.  This approach, in tandem 
with an increasingly powerful military, allows China to challenge US supremacy in the 
region, raising issues for US extended deterrence.  Our US speaker was especially 
troubled that “too many” in the PLA believe that they can fight a war with the US and, as 
a result of China’s growing might, keep it below the nuclear threshold.  Concerns about 
the growth of the PLA Navy and the increasing capabilities of the submarine fleet are 
shared by all three defense establishments. While the South China Sea has become the 
focal point of regional anxiety, there are fears that tensions there could spill over into 
other areas, such as the East China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, especially after Taiwan’s 
2016 presidential election, a ballot that looks increasingly likely to be won by the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a traditionally pro-independence party that has had 
poor relations with Beijing. 
 
 Finally, there is a lengthening list of nontraditional security threats, such as public 
health, WMD proliferation, maritime safety and security, and environmental destruction, 
that consume the time and attention of defense planners. These issues offer many 
opportunities for multilateral cooperation, but they tend to be obscured by more pressing 
and sensational dangers (and don’t seem to address US extended deterrence).  There are 
bilateral efforts to strengthen cooperation and coordination in new domains such as space 
and cyberspace, but those programs are in their infancy and there is a need to explore 
cooperation with new partners. 
 
 Our speakers also acknowledged that not all the significant changes occur in other 
countries; there are equally (or potentially as) disruptive events occurring within our three 
countries. The Russian challenge to the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, in tandem 
with the rise of ISIS in the Middle East, raise doubts about the durability of the US 
commitment to the rebalance. Stronger militaries in South Korea and Japan allow those 
two countries to do more in their own defense; those shifts raise questions about role and 
responsibilities within each country’s alliance with the United States. 
 
 Discussion challenged one important element of the emerging consensus on 
deterrence: the significance of new domains such as space and cyber. There was 
considerable push back against hyping threats to these domains. While they are 
increasingly important to the effective functioning of modern militaries (and society more 
generally), several speakers insisted that they are “just capabilities to use in a 
contingency.” In other words, these new domains may not pose new problems, but may 
instead require the application of existing intellectual constructs, leaving aside the 
problem of attribution.   
 
Trilateral Cooperation to Deter and Respond 
 
 Rising uncertainties about deterrence have typically been the result of changes in 
the capabilities of adversaries. Equally important, however, are shifts in the thinking and 
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capabilities of the US and its allies. Agreement on threats or how to combat them is a 
prerequisite for action. And even if governments agree on what constitutes a danger and 
the appropriate response to it, they must have the tools to act. One of the most important 
recent developments in Northeast Asian security, and one that dominated discussions at 
this meeting, previous iterations, and similar sit-downs, has been changes in Japanese 
thinking about its regional security role and the policy shifts that are a consequence of 
this evolution.   
 
 There is a large gap in the understanding of what Japan is undertaking and why. 
Our meeting took place after the announcement of the new Guidelines for US-Japan 
Security Cooperation and before the Diet passed legislation implementing those changes 
and reflecting the new interpretation of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense 
(CSD) promulgated by the Cabinet of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on July 1, 
2014. The Japanese national debate on these changes has highlighted three key points. 
First, the changes are intended to help Japan be a better ally and partner of the United 
States and to be able to contribute to regional security in a manner consistent with the 
benefits Japan has reaped from such stability. Second, the changes will be far less 
sweeping than many anticipate: Japanese participants in our dialogue have repeatedly 
emphasized that a great danger is that of inflated expectations of what Tokyo will be able 
to do in a crisis. Third, the new security legislation continues to unnerve some South 
Koreans (and a significant portion of the Japanese public as well, judging from the 
protests, demonstrations, and legislative tactics of the opposition).   
 
 Many South Koreans (experts, officials, and the general public) are uncomfortable 
with ambiguity in Japanese government statements about future policy, forgetting that 
contingencies define strategic planning and uncertainty (and hence ambiguity) are 
inherent in such thinking. In our meetings, Korean participants generally welcomed (with 
some qualifications) the anticipated changes. At the same time – and understandably 
since debates in Tokyo are ongoing – there remains uncertainty about what Japan will be 
doing. Almost all Korean participants emphasized the need for Japan to get the consent of 
countries with which it “interacted”: in plain speak, Tokyo must get Seoul’s prior 
approval for any security activities that it undertakes on Korean territory or in its waters. 
Consultation is a must, a reality that all Japanese acknowledged. (Not without some small 
amount of frustration, however: when South Koreans are not present, some Japanese 
complain that Koreans seem to forget that the changes are intended to facilitate a 
response that helps South Korea in an emergency, and to strengthen deterrence – which 
benefits Korea – more generally.)   
 
 To their credit, Japanese participants seized the opportunity of this meeting – as 
they did last year – to address US and Korean concerns about new security thinking and 
policies. Speakers highlighted the importance of the whole of government mechanism for 
alliance coordination in the new defense guidelines and stressed the opportunities for 
cooperation with the US and “other partners.” They emphasized the “stringent 
conditions” that will limit Japan’s exercise of CSD, particularly the necessity of a request 
from the country under armed attack. Speakers underlined that the Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF) will not participate in armed operations.  
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 Still, the door is now open to more operational integration between the US, Japan, 
and other forces beyond Japan’s territorial waters. The allies, and perhaps others, will be 
able to share information, promote situational awareness, and begin joint planning. As 
one speaker explained, these changes offer the potential to alter the traditional division of 
labor within the alliance, in which Japan provides the shield and the US is the spear. 
Now, Japan can help in both roles, although its spear will be short. The new guidelines 
can stimulate conversations among the allies and other partners about new roles in areas 
such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR), search and rescue, and refugee management. But, critically, these efforts demand a 
structure for operational coordination and such a framework does not exist.   
 
 Those last points commanded universal agreement and other speakers noted that 
increasing congestion in the various domains (air, sea, cyber, outer space) means that 
conflict anywhere in the region has the potential to quickly spread. “Provocations are,” 
warned one US speaker, “threats to all.” In this environment, a failure to communicate, 
coordinate, and cooperate risks failure and fratricide.  A failure to work together it not 
just a lost opportunity but a genuine loss because it creates conditions for a failure to 
secure national interests. In fact, our US speaker argued, coordination is not enough: 
interoperability that leads to integration and then interdependence should be the goal.  
 
 Yet despite steady US efforts to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in its 
defense planning and policy and to rely instead on other tools in the deterrence tool kit, a 
South Korean speaker reiterated a troubling bottom line: only nuclear weapons deter 
nuclear weapons, and only the US has those weapons. As a result, Seoul and Tokyo 
remain dependent on the US extended deterrent. While that may be a statement of first 
principles, one implication is disturbing: As a result of this dependence, our South 
Korean skeptic explained, “there is no urgency to create trilateral cooperation. Bilateral 
cooperation is enough.” 
 
 To deal with this problem and to help prevent US allies from free riding, our ROK 
speaker endorsed a trilateral strategic deterrence committee to coordinate nuclear plans 
and policies and to show joint nuclear resolve. An active role for the two allies in 
controlling nuclear retaliatory capability would, he insisted, “make trilateral cooperation 
much easier to achieve.”  
 
 Two issues loomed large as the group sought common ground, and China figured 
prominently in both. The first was defining the scope of challenges that would invoke the 
US deterrent – or to put it another way, what is the US expected to deter? Today, the test 
is dealing with behavior that remains below the threshold that invites a kinetic response, 
in the so-called “gray zone,” such as salami-slicing in the South China Sea or other 
moves that threaten to erode the status quo. One US participant warned that China, like 
other adversaries, will take advantage of “speed, geography, and asymmetries of stake to 
obtain strategic objectives without a US response.” Japanese, in particular, sought greater 
clarity about how the US would respond to Chinese efforts to change the status quo that 
did not invite military action. It is telling that one Japanese participant offered effusive 
praise for forthright US statements of commitment regarding the Senkakus, a declaration 
 5 
that indicates a readiness on the part of the US to impose costs on adversaries. That is not 
enough for some, however. They seek more details on how the US will wage a long-term 
competition against China. 
 
 Acknowledging the broader spectrum of potential challenges in Northeast Asia 
demands a reassessment of the appropriate division of labor among allies when 
responding to crises, with some arguing that allies are primarily responsible for their own 
defense against gray zone challenges. In lower intensity conflicts, the most important 
military capabilities will often be those of South Korea and Japan as they confront 
immediate challenges to their national interests. They therefore must have both the forces 
and the doctrines to deal with those threats with the US in a supporting role (while 
providing its extended deterrent). While there was some disagreement about the 
respective roles of each country in particular contingencies – and both allies sought 
greater clarity on how the US could contribute to their defense – there was agreement on 
the need for a US forward presence in the region.  
  
 That claim that the US should be playing a more of a supporting role was 
buttressed by the claim that war-weariness in the US would prevent any government in 
Washington from fighting another war, especially if the trigger is a gray zone incident. 
“The US public will not go to war over a provocation,” declared one US participant. This 
is an especially unsettling assertion if China seeks, as some assert, to make the gray zone 
as big as possible. Other US participants pushed back against that argument, asserting 
that public fatigue is overstated and that is no reason to not meet alliance commitments. 
 
 Nevertheless, as in the past, US participants warned against demanding too much 
from the US nuclear deterrent. Not all crises demand a military response and nuclear 
signaling is to be reserved for only the most severe cases, high-intensity contingencies. 
US participants recalled the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review which articulated US 
strategy as intended to prevent adversaries from escalating their way out of failed 
conventional aggression. That reminder triggered some discord among the US 
participants, with several warning that an emphasis on de-escalation risked sending the 
wrong signal about US priorities, and one reminding the group that it is a means to an end 
– crisis management in pursuit of broader US objectives – and not an end in itself. If 
deterrence aims at preventing a crisis from arising, then the focus of trilateral cooperation 
should be shaping conditions before a crisis arises. Given the range of issues and 
potential threats involved, the framework for such cooperation must be multidimensional 
to deal with multifaceted challenges. By implication, then, the current focus on an 
information sharing agreement, while welcome and essential, is just a preliminary step. 
To call it an accomplishment says volumes about the current political relationship 
between Seoul and Tokyo. 
 
 While much of the discussion involved ways to respond to Chinese provocations, 
Northeast Asian political dynamics afford China another way to shape thinking about 
deterrence: Beijing currently sets the ceiling on trilateral cooperation. While opposed to 
US alliances in general and being especially wary of institutional steps that consolidate 
links between the US and its security partners, Beijing is thought to be prepared to 
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acquiesce to trilateral cooperation only as long as it is seen to be focused on North Korea. 
If there is any chance that such cooperation can be used against China, then Beijing will 
bring political pressure on Seoul to stop. Ever-expanding economic relations between 
China and South Korea, a belief in Seoul that the road to Pyongyang runs through 
Beijing, and a convergence of views about history – especially Japan’s behavior in the 
first half of the 20th century – between Beijing and Seoul, has prompted many observers 
to question the durability of the US-ROK alliance. Some openly suggest that Korea is 
falling into China’s sphere of influence. Korean participants have acknowledged a 
growing consideration of Chinese views in South Korean decision making on a variety of 
subjects, but they rejected – as they have every time we have discussed this issue – that 
this constitutes an erosion of South Korea’s commitment to the alliance. They respond 
that the China-Korea relationship is based on profit, while the US-Korea partnership is 
forged by shared sacrifice (to protect shared interests and values), and that China only 
takes South Korea seriously because of its alliance with the US. Nevertheless, there is 
clear consensus (evident at this meeting and its predecessors) that trilateral security 
cooperation to strengthen the deterrent is only possible toward North Korea.  
 
Tabletop exercise – move 1 
 
 As at last year’s meeting, the conference featured a two-move, tabletop exercise 
in which teams representing the US, Japan, and South Korea responded to a crisis 
scenario. In the first move, North Korea invaded and overran Daecheong Island, a small, 





 US objectives in move one included a demonstration of commitment and 
reassurance to allies (on the Korean Peninsula, regionally, and globally); reversing North 
Korean aggression; showing US leadership in the crisis;  preventing further aggression 
(and reducing the DPRK capability to do so); enhancing trilateral cooperation; and 
maintaining domestic support for such actions. Deliberations also emphasized a need to 
move quickly – the example of the first Persian Gulf War, when the US took six months 
to assemble a global coalition to crush Saddam Hussein, was deemed inappropriate. Yet 
merely returning to the territorial status quo was insufficient. The US team agreed that 
North Korea must be worse off than before the aggression and must lose some of its 
standing military capability. Hanging over these objectives was the thorny question of 
how to engage China. The group assumed that Pyongyang wouldn't have acted without 
being prepared to ignore Chinese objections.  
 
 Its military reactions included moving to DefCon 3 and beginning a flow of forces 
consistent with OP5027; preparing and supporting ROK military action – to get the 
hostages, impose costs on North Korea, and to protect Seoul – in immediate response to 
the crisis; flowing C4ISR as much as possible; protecting the US and the US military 
from North Korean cyber attacks; taking action to signal commitment to the language of 
the 2014 QDR not to allow escalation out of aggression, although there was no agreement 
on what that entailed. The US group considered whether nuclear signaling was 
                                                 
1
 The details of the TTX are available in Appendix C 
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appropriate – whether “to show a little nuclear leg” – but concluded that there was no 
need for an open display of nuclear forces at this point. Options included moving nuclear 
forces closer to the region, flowing BMD, and deploying strike assets. 
 
 Americans expected the ROK to lead militarily and anticipated the prompt 
recovery of ROK cyber systems. They wanted Japan to facilitate the flow of UN forces 
and logistics, raise its military alert level, and ensure that it was reducing its cyber 
vulnerabilities. At the same time, Americans anticipated that Japan would send no signal 
of any kind that could be interpreted in Seoul or Pyongyang as a sign of independent 
Japanese action; indeed, Americans expected Japan to take no action in the Korean 
theater at this point, although Tokyo could act on the high seas and assist with ISR. From 
Seoul, it expected signs of restraint even as the ROK took action: there should be clear 
distinctions between military strikes against forces occupying Daecheong Island and 
crossing the DMZ or hitting Pyongyang. In other words, red lines should be respected. 
This is no invitation to start a full-scale war or try to decapitate the North Korean regime. 
 
 ROK participants first assessed North Korean motives and concluded that the 
distance of the provocation from the mainland meant that Pyongyang had limited 
intentions and was not trying to start a full-scale war. Seoul’s priorities when responding 
therefore were putting the armed forces on the highest level of alert; obtaining support 
from allies and the international community, including China and Russia; blockading and 
isolating Daecheong island (including a no fly zone); retaliating against parts of the North 
Korean mainland; requesting the deployment of US strategic assets; and retaking the 
island. 
 
 They wanted the US to warn North Korea against further provocations and 
demonstrate strong support for the ROK by, among other things, the deployment of 
military assets to the theater – sending nuclear capable equipment to Guam was 
suggested because ROK participants expect North Korea to issue nuclear threats early in 
a crisis of this nature – and real-time intelligence assessments. A concern about the 
economic impact of the crisis impelled the ROK team to request a currency swap with 
Washington. Tokyo should also warn North Korea, declare its strong support for Seoul, 
share intelligence, and provide logistical support for forces on the Peninsula and those 
passing through Japan. A currency swap would also be high on the lists of ROK requests 
to Tokyo. (As in last year’s exercise, the Koreans were the only team that put a priority 
on economic responses to the crisis.)  
 
 Both countries should refrain from unilateral measures that might cause panic in 
the ROK, such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Koreans also do not want 
to hear calls to “act with restraint” when such statements in fact mean “do not retaliate.” 
The Korean team anticipated heavy international pressure to avoid actions that could lead 
to escalation; this threatened to undercut the more compelling need for Seoul to take 
action to signal strength. Korean participants also worried that the UN would intervene 
and freeze the situation, a move that would, among other things, open the door to Chinese 
intervention in the crisis (at least diplomatically).   
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 Americans noted that the ROK desire for a nuclear signal from the US was 
inconsistent with its assessment of North Korean intentions; if the takeover was “just a 
provocation,” why bother? Moreover, given the presence of tens, if not hundreds, of 
thousands of Americans in Seoul, symbols of US commitment should be evident to ally 
and adversary alike. If that is not sufficient, then Seoul needs to be explicit in its request 
for more. Moreover, US participants noted a potential disconnect in the allied response: 
while Seoul is eager to strike back quickly, the US emphasized the need to engage 
OpCon procedures. A Japanese participant highlighted another disconnect: despite 
arguing that Seoul cannot take any action that might alienate Beijing, Koreans also 
assume that China will not support its actions in the UN. If the working assumption is 
that China won’t back Seoul in peninsular crises, then why defer to Beijing in other 
matters?  
 
 Koreans explained they were tired of self-restraint. While they have no desire to 
start a war, they will not be attacked with impunity and will seek to lead in any response 
to North Korean provocations. As for China, there is “some confidence” that the PRC 
will play a constructive role in crisis resolution, but there is also a premium on quick 
action by the ROK – and especially to retake the island – to hedge against Chinese 
obstructionism.   
 
 Japanese participants distinguished this attack from other, previous North Korean 
provocations. As an armed attack, it legitimates an armed response by Seoul.  That risks 
escalation to full-scale war but it is not a foregone conclusion. Their priorities included: 
support for an ROK government proportional response to return to the status quo based 
on the 1953 armistice agreement; a demonstration of political will to stop further 
aggression, while harboring some concern about ROK over-reaction; individual actions 
to protect Japanese citizens in the ROK (preparation for NEOs); the avoidance of any 
spillover attack against Japan; and engaging China to help de-escalate the crisis.  
 
 Japanese military steps included intelligence gathering, along with increased ISR 
efforts; preparation for BMD measures; the activation of alliance coordination 
mechanisms, which include the recognition that this is a “situation in areas surrounding 
Japan” (SIASJ), which allows the Tokyo government to invoke the US-Japan Defense 
guidelines; and putting the SDF on higher alert. Washington is expected to fully support 
the ROK; condemn Pyongyang; help the ROK manage escalation; make use of flexible 
deterrence options; recognize the need to protect Japanese citizens in South Korea; 
pursue action at the UN Security Council (which would legitimate Japanese assistance), 
and engage China diplomatically. The ROK should be mindful of the need to protect 
Japanese citizens on the peninsula, work through the UNSC, and share intelligence. 
Japanese urged their ROK counterparts to make requests to Japan clear and incapable of 
misinterpretation and to make escalation control a priority. Similarly, among their no-
noes was bypassing Tokyo on major decisions; they specifically warned South Koreans 
against going to Beijing with information or decisions before Tokyo. Japanese 
participants emphasized that while their country has little to offer militarily in a crisis, 
Tokyo must have prior consultation with the ROK and the US. Neither Tokyo’s 
acquiescence nor its active/passive participation can be assumed.   
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 Assessing round one, it was clear that no country had a firm grip on North Korean 
goals and objectives but all assumed they were limited – perhaps to achieve territorial 
gain or to show strength to a domestic audience. US and ROK participants sought a 
decisive response to Pyongyang’s moves: recovering the territory, freeing hostages, and 
punishing it for the provocation. All recognized the potential for escalation, however.  
While backing Seoul, there was an expectation by Americans of greater consultation and 
coordination with the Combined Forces Command if such a crisis arose. One potentially 
important disconnect was if and when the transfer of OpCon would occur, with 
Americans expecting it earlier than South Koreans – who sought more autonomy to strike 
back. Indeed, ROK participants seemed surprised by the extent to which the US backed 
decisive military action.  
 
 Divergences between the ROK and Japan were evident. Japanese seemed more 
concerned with escalation than South Koreans; Japanese preparation for NEO was 
problematic for Koreans for a number of reasons – the signal it sent and the prospect of 
Japanese military forces on ROK soil being the two most prominent. Finally, Japan 
proposed taking the issue to the UNSC, while the ROK team supported an initial 
unilateral response.  
 
Tabletop exercise – move 2 
 
 In the second move, North Korea responded to ROK threats of retaliation by 
insisting that it plans to keep Daecheong, demanding that the ROK abandon 
Baengnyeong-do (a nearby island even further north and closer to the Korean Peninsula), 
renewing its commitment to the redrawing of the Northern Limit Line, dispersing road 
mobile missiles, and issuing veiled threats regarding the use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) against both the ROK and Japan. In an interjection during the 
deliberations, it was revealed that North Korea detonated a nuclear device over the Sea of 
Japan. 
 
 For South Korean participants, these developments meant that their original goals 
– reversion to the status quo and stabilizing the situation – were no longer possible and 
asserted that the survival of the ROK regime was at risk if the government did not 
respond. The situation had escalated from a local provocation to an act of war and the 
country had to respond accordingly. This meant continuing with the deterrence regime 
while quietly preparing for war, and notifying allies – and China – that Seoul was doing 
so.  
 
 Specific military measures include moving the threat level to WatchCon 1 and 
DefCon 2; activation of OP5027; the total mobilization of resources; deployment of strike 
and missile assets, along with a request to the US to deploy ISR measures, a priority for 
which was the location of mobile targets that had been dispersed. In addition, the 
government would take steps to stabilize the economy (such as the imposition of capital 
controls), and ensure the safety of all foreigners in the ROK (including Japanese, 
Americans, and Chinese). Korean participants conceded that retaking the island had 
become a secondary goal; the primary objective was the full deployment of all military 
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assets to retaliate against North Korea (being ready if necessary to start a larger war), 
while sending a strong message to Russia and China to not intervene in ways that 
interfere with ROK intentions and to pressure Pyongyang to not use its nuclear weapons. 
 
 The US was expected to deploy all its assets (diplomatic, economic, and military) 
on behalf of South Korean goals and to restrain Japan from engaging in a preemptive 
strike. Japan should only act in tandem with the ROK and the US, while providing ASW 
capabilities and intelligence. It should also refrain from any NEO without Seoul’s 
consent. 
 
 The US was warned away from any back-channel discussions with China 
(without ROK knowledge); while any such talks would be seen as prejudicial to South 
Korean interests, the ROK team was especially insistent that there should be no talk of 
escalation control without Seoul’s participation. 
 
 For the South Korean team, nuclear use changed everything.  While there was 
concern about escalation in move 1, the detonation signaled to South Koreans that the 
North was ready to use nuclear weapons and the group believed that the only way to 
control escalation was to threaten all-out war. If the South merely insisted on reverting to 
the status quo there was a fear that the country would be subject to ongoing nuclear 
blackmail. As a result, ROK objectives shifted to regime change (“the beginning of the 
end of the North Korean state”) and all necessary means would be enlisted in that effort. 
Some participants noted a problem in the ROK logic: team participants conceded that 
they needed time to mobilize assets, but they didn’t want to give Pyongyang time to 
strike. Significantly, South Koreans believe that if the ROK president pushes hard enough 
for regime change, “the US will have to listen.”  
 
 For the Japanese team, nuclear use constituted escalation but not to a point where 
full-scale war was necessary or justified. They reasoned that Pyongyang’s overriding 
objective is regime survival and therefore it would not launch a warning shot; if it was 
going to use a nuclear weapon, it would only be to attempt to coerce or to launch an all-
out war. As one participant explained, “North Korea won’t commit suicide; offer them 
the chance of survival if they behave.” The reluctance to accept the necessity of such a 
war shaped Japanese thinking throughout the exercise. So, even while some Japanese 
participants were prepared to endorse a crossing of the DMZ for limited tactical 
objectives, “war” was to be avoided. National objectives did change, however: enhancing 
allied deterrence and defense remained the top priority, but avoiding a spillover of 
tensions on Japan became equally important. The team also noted that new significance 
was attached to engaging Russia.  
 
 Anticipated military steps included the convening of the National Security 
Council (NSC) and mobilizing and issuing the preparatory order for defense cooperation. 
This would include moving to DefCon 3 and requesting telephone summit talks with 
Washington and Seoul. In that conversation, the US would be asked to enhance its 
deterrent and defense of Japan while Tokyo would offer full support for US forces. As 
part of that effort, the US would be asked to forward deploy strategic assets to the 
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Western Pacific (moving SSBNs to Guam was mentioned). Japan seeks a show of US 
strategic resolve, coupled with a posture that demonstrates patience. Japan would back 
US and Korean efforts to locate and take out mobile North Korean missiles – the 
deployment of which was identified as “a grave threat to Japan.” Washington would also 
be asked to back Japan in expressing caution in moving toward war.  President Park 
would be given full support and assistance, but Japan would caution that it does not yet 
back an all-out war. She would also be asked to enhance the protection of Japanese 
nationals in the ROK.  
 
 The Japanese team explained that it would rally domestic support with a press 
conference to explain its actions and the logic behind them to the public and world. While 
condemning further escalation by North Korea, the government would comfort the public 
by noting that extended deterrence is secure and Japan is safe.  
 
 Nuclear detonation would trigger a second round of measures – another NSC 
meeting, more phone calls, and another public statement. Tokyo would step up measures 
to protect Japan against a possible terrorist attack by North Korean sleeper cells and call 
for the evaluation of Japanese nationals in ROK, with ROK assistance. The UNSC would 
be asked to convene. The US would be expected to take the lead in convening a 
conference among Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing to discuss the crisis. Japanese 
participants explained that Tokyo would not fight a decision by the ROK and the US to 
promote regime change in Pyongyang, but it would not actively back such a step; in 
something of an aside, one explained that he wouldn’t really expect the US to listen to 
Japan’s arguments in this setting. Other Japanese participants highlighted that of course 
Japan favors unification of the Korean Peninsula under Seoul.  
 
 For the US team, step 2 made trilateral cooperation more difficult. The nuclear 
dimension transforms the nature of this crisis and makes managing that problem the 
number two US objective, overtaking even the commitment to US allies. Thus, its first 
five steps were a public statement and private diplomacy by the White House to establish 
US views of the stakes, highlighting that the nuclear detonation changed the 
characterization of US interests. Assurance to allies and the US public would continue to 
drive US thinking and actions, with a message that the world is not at the brink of nuclear 
war, that the situation can be managed and de-escalated, that the responsibility for de-
escalation rests on Pyongyang, and that China and Russia can play a constructive role – 
as long as they were not complicit in the events of step 1. The US would expect the ROK 
and Japan to issue a statement backing the US position.  
 
 At the same time, the US would be seeking to clearly and fully understand ROK 
military intent and ascertain how Seoul will escalate. Military forces would move to 
DefCon 2 and more tactical and strategic assets would be deployed to the theater, with a 
focus on getting the islands back and ensuring that a second island isn’t seized. 
Homeland BMD would be ramped up and the government would prepare NEOs.   
 
 While backing the Seoul government, the US team did not embrace regime 
removal as a military objective. And action to demonstrate military resolve – sending US 
 12 
soldiers to the second island under threat or preemptive attacks on missiles deployed and 
artillery in range of Seoul – would stop short of nuclear strikes. The US is also ready to 
signal using nuclear-capable assets.  
 
 Explaining what it expected allies to do, the US team distinguished between 
anticipating the following actions without necessarily desiring them. First, Seoul and 
Tokyo are thought to want to engage actively with US in assessments of nuclear and 
cyber threats and responses. It expects both allies to engage in discussion about nuclear 
assets that they wish to have displayed. It wants both to also discuss realistic options 
regarding preemptive strikes against the North. The US expects both allies to mobilize 
the military in both countries, including their full MD systems. Japan is anticipated to call 
for a NEO. The US also would be preparing for radiation response and US aid after the 
nuclear blast. 
 
 The US team hoped that the ROK would not cave in under pressure from 
Pyongyang (it didn’t) but also hoped that Seoul wouldn't seek regime change as its new 
objective (it did). Americans also hoped that ROK government would not issue a public 
declaration of intent to reunify the Korean Peninsula by military means. It was hoped that 
Japan would remain resolute – concern focused on the Diet, not the government – and 
would not constrain US/UN forces in Japan. There was also some trepidation that either 
government in Seoul or Tokyo might be seduced by Beijing during the crisis.  
 
Assessing the exercise 
 
 For the most part, the three countries’ response to the crisis was positive; each 
government understood the motivations and concerns of the others and did not act in a 
manner that would generate tensions among the three. The biggest division emerged 
during move two: while all three country teams supported decisive military action to 
retake the island and to inflict a blow against Pyongyang, the US and the ROK were more 
inclined to move to broader political objectives, while Japanese participants were only 
prepared to back tactical moves, not full-scale war. Japanese insisted that the North 
Korean regime was not suicidal and would therefore not be signaling its desire (or 
readiness) for a war it could not win. By this logic, even a nuclear warning shot was just 
another provocation. 
 
 American participants countered that the nuclear detonation constituted a radical 
shift in the situation. As conflicts become more nuclear, the nature of the US interests 
that are involved change: the focus shifts to the credibility of US commitments as well as 
the reputation of nuclear weapons. As one US participant explained, nuclear use would 
constitute a radical move that would “be shocking and decisive in its political effect.” It is 
important to recognize this dimension of US thinking and distinguish it from more 
mundane reasons for restraint: Washington is not constrained by North Korea’s KN08 
threat, and the homeland is not vulnerable. Nevertheless, the US team was not convinced 
that North Korea was prepared to fight an all-out war; this was blackmail, not the prelude 
to full-scale conflict. (Yet even if “just” nuclear blackmail, the three countries had to 
show Pyongyang that it would not work.) At the same time, it was clear that even if 
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North Korean actions were not sufficient to validate a new political objective – regime 
change – they did oblige the allies to start thinking about and preparing for escalation. 
 
 De-escalation could prove difficult. What would happen if, for example, North 
Korea called for a ceasefire while still in possession of Daecheong Island (and 
abandoning its demand for the second one)? A ROK participant was blunt about what 
would follow: a failure to get the island back would convince the South Korean public 
that deterrence failed, prompting the country to withdraw from the NPT and acquire its 
own nuclear weapons. Would South Korea be satisfied if North Korea returned the island 
before Seoul got in a “sufficient” retaliatory strike? This question exposes an important 
distinction in how the ROK and the US think about escalation. For Americans, escalation 
involves the nuclear ladder; South Koreans, in contrast, think about escalation of political 
objectives (retrieving territory, disarming the North’s nuclear capability, promoting 
regime change in Pyongyang, or reunifying the Peninsula). 
 
 Two other important issues emerged during the exercise. The first was the 
reluctance of all countries to use the cyber attacks that were part of the scenario as 
justification for retaliatory steps against North Korea. All individuals who commented on 
this dimension of the problem focused on the difficulty of attributing the origin of attacks 
and this restrained any response.  
 
 The second issue concerned Japan. The scenario took place before Japan passed 
new security legislation on exercising the right of collective self-defense. In those 
circumstances, Tokyo was severely constrained to take any action beyond defense of 
territory and territorial waters. Even the prospect of nuclear contamination from a 
detonation would not be considered an attack and justify an armed response. The limited 
range of Japanese measures that the government could take in this scenario created some 
exasperation among US participants; it is hoped that the new security legislation will lift 
some of those constraints, although any US relief at the new latitude is likely to be 
balanced by concern among South Koreans.  
 
 Most significantly, however, Japan must establish mechanisms that allow the SDF 
to join a conversation about how it can contribute to the resolution of regional 
contingencies. Throughout the exercise, it was emphasized that the speed of decision 
making was critical to the successful conclusion of this crisis on terms amenable to the 
allies. Yet there is currently no way for the SDF to communicate with the operational 
command in Korea. That must be remedied.  
 
 Finally, more attention must be paid to China. While no one believed that Beijing 
was prepared to turn its back on Pyongyang, most participants believed that North Korea 
is becoming a burden, if not a liability, for China. There is evidence of growing irritation 
among Chinese decision-makers that offers the allies a chance to drive a wedge between 
the two communist partners. At the same time, the government in Seoul must be sensitive 






 Like its predecessor, this meeting was applauded as a unique opportunity to air 
concerns and explore options during Northeast Asian crises that simply is not available in 
official dialogues. The candid and frank dialogue is a result of the seriousness with which 
all three countries take these issues, and this meeting reflects years of engagement to 
build trust that allows participants to address sensitive topics despite sometimes fierce 
disagreements.  
 
 Plainly, there is more work ahead for the three countries to sustain and strengthen 
deterrence. More needs to be done to build stronger, more durable relations between 
Seoul and Tokyo. The bar for bilateral (and trilateral) cooperation is still too low. While 
this reflects broader political and social phenomena, it is vital to start building a cadre of 
individuals in the defense and foreign policy communities in all three countries who 
accept trilateral cooperation as a good to be pursued; we should not have to argue on 
behalf of such cooperation as a goal. Meetings such as the Maui dialog can be 
instrumental in creating that cadre. (This is in addition to taking the results of the Maui 
discussions to broader audiences in Japan and Korea and build public support for 
trilateral cooperation, as is called for in the grant that supports this effort.)  
 
 Second, more needs to be done to raise knowledge and awareness of nuclear 
issues and the effective functioning of deterrence. While participants at the Maui meeting 
are generally quite good, there is a sense that the benches in Japan and the ROK are not 
deep. As the nuclear dimension of crisis management in Northeast Asia grows, as the 
capabilities of allies and adversaries increase, and as the gray zone expands, it is critical 
that US allies have a better understanding of the stakes in crises and the respective 
apportioning of roles. It is not enough to ask the US to signal using strategic assets. Allies 
need to be more specific in their requests and must be better able to explain the rational 
for such requests. This turns, fundamentally, on a clear understanding of how deterrence 
works, what the US strategic capabilities are for, and how responses to regional crises 
have impact and significance beyond their immediate circumstances.  
 
 The new apportioning of roles and responsibilities takes on more significance as 
Japan passes legislation that could afford it a new role in regional security affairs. This 
new capability demands that Japan prepare for the actual use of the armed forces 
(pursuant to the new legislation) and simultaneously do more to blunt regional concerns 
about the potential destabilizing impact of this new role. 
 
 Successful trilateral cooperation against North Korea rests on a shared 
understanding of how Pyongyang thinks, its intentions, and its theory of victory. Failure 
to reach consensus – at least beyond the most superficial level – means that concerted 
action will not be possible. Our exercise suggests that common ground is missing. While 
there is agreement that North Korea is not suicidal, that the regime makes survival its top 
priority, and that it will do everything it can to blackmail other countries and exploit 
opportunities to drive wedges between allies and partners, consensus quickly erodes 
when the conversation turns to ways to deal with the North in specific scenarios. All 
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governments zealously protect their own equities, while worrying excessively about 
escalation and spillover when another party is Pyongyang’s primary target. That potential 
conflict could be reduced if there is agreement on specific North Korean intentions in the 







Summary and Conclusions 
From Young Leaders’ Assessments 
 
 The Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program was established in 2004 to 
nurture the next generation of Asia-Pacific security specialists. We identify rising stars 
between the ages of 25-35 and introduce them at this early stage in their careers to Track 
1.5 and Track 2 processes. Ideal candidates are good ambassadors for themselves, their 
institutions, and our program. They are motivated, eager to learn, and capable of 
contributing to our network of senior and junior experts.  Young Leaders are invited to 
participate in the table-top exercise (TTX) activities through critical analysis of the senior 
teams. We aim to identify any generational differences between the senior and more 
junior experts. The below summaries reflect the Young Leaders’ analysis of the 
performance and process of the TTX from the perspectives of their country teams. Their 
next generation assessment emphasizes diplomacy and cooperation and provides a 
hopeful foundation for the future of trilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia. 
 
 In many areas, the YL groups’ assessments of the TTX matched those of the 
senior participants. The ROK YLs emphasized domestic political dynamics that would 
force the South Korean president to respond quickly and decisively. The Japanese group 
focused on Japan’s legal limits, both before and after the reinterpretation of the 
constitution, that would constrain its actions. The Americans hoped US allies would take 
on a large role in their own defense, encouraging advances in South Korea’s ability to 
respond to provocations and greater missile defense cooperation. 
 
 But in other areas there were clear differences in how the YLs viewed the TTX. 
The YLs felt the exercise accurately portrayed the type of provocation that North Korea 
might pursue, the different interests between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, 
and the reluctance that the United States would have in using nuclear weapons. But they 
doubt that North Korea would use nuclear weapons so early in an escalating conventional 
conflict. The Japanese YLs also felt that the way the device was delivered, a detail not 
provided in the TTX, could have a significant effect on Tokyo’s thinking about how to 
respond. 
 
 A second major difference was the emphasis that the YL and senior groups placed 
on engaging with China and Russia. The senior groups acknowledged the need to engage 
China during the crisis, but gave little credence to diplomacy with Beijing. Instead, they 
assumed that Pyongyang wouldn’t have acted without being prepared to ignore Beijing’s 
objections. The YLs, by contrast, thought that Beijing could play a productive role, both 
as an intermediary to discern Pyongyang’s intentions and potentially as partner to offer 
carrots and sticks to persuade Pyongyang to deescalate the crisis. The US YLs also felt 
that the United States, Japan, and South Korea would benefit from reaching out to 
Moscow during the TTX, while the senior groups hardly mentioned Russia. 
 
 Third, compared to the senior groups, the YLs were less hawkish. The YL groups 
nearly universally thought that their colleagues put too much emphasis on military 
instruments at the expense of diplomacy. ROK YLs thought that the ROK should have 
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initiated negotiations with North Korea after the first move to try to recover the hostages 
and find a peaceful solution. Japanese YLs similarly though that there were more 
opportunities for diplomacy than the teams availed themselves of, while US YLs felt that, 
even in the military realm, there were more restrained options that the three countries 
could have chosen that would have achieved their objectives with less risk of escalation. 
 
 There are a number of possible reasons why the YLs reached different 
conclusions, but, with a small group and a sample of one, they are mostly speculative. 
Some have postulated, for example, that the generation that grew up after the Cold War 
and lived through the second Iraq war is now more reserved about using US military 
force abroad. A better explanation, however, is the different professional backgrounds of 
the YL and senior groups. The senior group was comprised of far more deterrence 
specialists, who tend to be more hawkish. As a result, they were comparatively more 
worried about the North Korean nuclear threat, less confident in diplomatic options, and 
more concerned with maintaining the credibility of US alliance commitments. 
 
 Despite differences in how they assessed the exercise, however, many of the YL 
recommendations mirrored those of the senior participants. The YLs encouraged greater 
trilateral cooperation between the US, ROK, and Japan, supporting additional bilateral 
Japan-ROK meetings and intelligence sharing and a US-Japan-ROK TTX at the official 
level. In addition, Japanese YLs called for greater confidence building measures with 
China to prevent miscalculation during a Korean Peninsula crisis, while American YLs 
suggested that the three countries reinforce international norms on nuclear non-use and 




Table Top Exercise: US Team 
Peter Cornett, Darcie Draudt, Adam Greer, Nina Silove, 
Tristan Volpe and Kelly Wadsworth 
 
The US-ROK-Japan Table-Top Exercise (TTX) exposed gaps in expectations of 
allies’ responses to an escalating conflict on the Korean Peninsula and the three teams 
missed opportunities for regional cooperation. 
 
The TTX began with an offensive first-move by North Korea. It is feasible such a 
large-scale provocation by an increasingly isolated North Korea would focus on an 
indefinite maritime border such as the northern islands, or a furtive cyberattack as it 
allegedly perpetrated in 2014. 
 
The TTX also realistically captured potential US-ROK-Japan dynamics, 
demonstrating a divide in willingness to respond to an escalating conflict. US and ROK 
policymakers have downplayed the risks of an escalated event on the premise that the 
North would not risk facing retaliation. However, as the 2010 Cheonan sinking and 
Yeonpyeong island shelling demonstrated, Pyongyang may still choose to use 
provocation for bargaining power or intimidation in the belief that the US preference for 
the status quo will restrain escalation. While ROK participants posited that escalation of 
the conflict might be a scenario under which they could seek regime change or 
reunification, the US and Japanese participants were wary, seeking to maintain stability 
instead. They proposed a rollback against the North to regain the captured island, and 
perhaps destroying DPRK land and sea assets nearby. This reveals a gap among the allies 
and partners – one that is not surprising, given the current strategic outlook and domestic 
politics in the three countries. 
 
The most unrealistic aspect of the TTX was the use of a nuclear device by the 
DPRK. North Korea’s continued advancement in nuclear weapons and mid- to long-
range delivery systems makes the potential of a deterrent nuclear detonation possible, but 
the speed with which North Korea “went nuclear” in this scenario is dubious. Most likely 
the North would limit the use of nuclear weapons to the case when a US-ROK invasion 
was imminent. The ally response to focus on conventional tactics rather than nuclear 
retaliation was, however, realistic. 
 
The US responses to the TTX lacked specificity in “demonstrating US 
commitment and resolve.” Specific signaling and escalation control mechanisms were 
comparatively overlooked.  North Korean aggression presented three challenges. First, 
DPRK advances presented a tactical challenge by seizing territory and hostages. Second, 
corresponding cyber-attacks threatened the larger ROK civilian base. Third, DPRK 
nuclear coercion not only presented the possibility of mass war, but also challenged the 
group with important questions about global deterrence. The first two challenges – seized 
territory and cyber-attacks – were eclipsed by the broader threat of nuclear war. This 
approach led the US to neglect important military counter-offensive options for hostage 
rescue, retaliation, aerial campaigns, cyber-attacks, and amphibious assault. Options for 
US-ROK-Japan interoperability were similarly neglected. 
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North Korea’s nuclear detonation posed a larger conceptual and practical 
problem.  Although the US team agreed they should “show a little nuclear leg,” there was 
only limited discussion as to what this meant. Mobilization of the nuclear bomber force, 
cancelling pre-planned exercises, and putting nuclear assets on active alert status would 
have sent different signals than the forward deployment of bomber nuclear assets, for 
example. Here again options for interoperability were neglected, especially with global 
nuclear powers such as Russia and China.    
 
Even though conditions for cooperation were prime, the US team neglected to 
involve Russia and China in the TTX, even after the North detonated a nuclear weapon. 
In the current international system – particularly when dealing with non-great power 
adversaries – the actions of Russia and China can influence outcomes, an influence that 
should be heeded by the US. Although Russia and China often act as spoilers and prevent 
the US from achieving its goals in the manner desired, there are some important instances 
in which Russia and China have acted to support US goals: chemical weapons in Syria 
(Russia); securing Pakistan’s cooperation for US military action against Afghanistan after 
9/11 (China) for example. In the TTX, the US could have approached China and Russia 
with three conditions that might have laid the groundwork for cooperation. First, North 
Korean nuclear use would need to have been de-coupled from other issues on the US-
China or US-Russia bilateral agenda and treated as singular in nature. Second, the US 
could have secured Russia and China’s cooperation via back-channel bilateral diplomacy, 
not through public declaratory statements or UN negotiations. Third, the issue could have 
been framed in terms of Russia and China’s national interests, as they both have strong 
interest in preventing nuclear conflict on the peninsula. 
 
The US response to the TTX failed to account for the above observations. It is 
likely that North Korea’s actions would be affected strongly by their perceptions not just 
of US-ROK resolve, but also by whether China and Russia would offer tacit or actual 
support to either party. The US team did not recognize of importance of managing 
relations with Russia and China. To the extent that the US discussed Russia and China at 
all in response to the DPRK’s actions, the focus was on either: (1) bringing the issue to 
the Security Council; or (2) making firm public statements to both states to signal US 
resolve. Neither of these tactics is likely to be successful in securing cooperation or at 
least acquiescence from these powers with regard to US strategy in response to a crisis on 
the Korean Peninsula. 
 
The DPRK exploited two vulnerabilities of US-ROK deterrence in the TTX: 
North Korean forces rapidly seized ROK land and hostages, and then attempted to 
compel a favorable end to the conflict through the first-use of a nuclear device. 
Deterrence failed because North Korea believed it could successfully accomplish its 
objective without incurring prohibitive costs. Because it is difficult to threaten to impose 
further costs during peacetime, we recommend a three-part denial strategy to minimize 
the likelihood of a comparable deterrence failure. 
 
First, to convince the DPRK that military success in gray zone provocations is 
unlikely, the US-ROK alliance should work to enhance ROK ability to independently 
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respond to limited attacks. The US could provide operational support and training, such 
as increased training in amphibious counterassault techniques. Second, to convince North 
Korea that nuclear demonstrations in support of nuclear blackmail will fail, the US 
should work with Japan and South Korea to ensure that a variety of missile defense 
capabilities (such as THAAD and Aegis) are actively deployed. Effective missile defense 
capabilities will enable the US and its allies to reduce the likelihood that North Korea can 
successfully engage in nuclear blackmail. Finally, to convince the DPRK that gray zone 
provocations will incur political consequences, the US and allies should reinforce 
international norms on nuclear non-use and seizure of territory. The establishment of 
nuclear non-use norms has been effective in delegitimizing nuclear use and increasing its 
political cost. Similarly, normative condemnation of seizure of territory by force 
increases the political costs of gray zone military aggression. 
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Table Top Exercise: Republic of Korea Team 
Yuri Kim, Minjung Lee, Seunghyuk Lee, 
Sungwon Lee, Julia Oh, and Seulah Song 
 
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have greatly intensified due to North Korean 
provocations, including nuclear tests, the sinking of the ROK naval vessel, Cheonan, and 
North Korea’s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. However, unlike these incidents, 
the scenario of the Table-Top Exercise (TTX) demonstrated unprecedented, war-
provoking actions from Pyongyang. 
 
In the exercise, the Republic of Korea (ROK) team realized that North Korea’s 
nuclear threat was no longer theoretical and was likely to occur again if Seoul did not 
respond decisively. President Park Geun-hye’s approval rating had declined steadily 
following the Sewol ferry incident, a bribery scandal, and the Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS) outbreak, and a passive reaction and failure to regain ROK territories 
would mean she could face both incessant public criticism, and possibly impeachment, 
according to the ROK Constitution Chapter IV, Section 1, Article 66-2. As a result, the 
ROK team did not seek to merely restore the status quo by recovering national territory, 
but instead took the opportunity to prepare for a full-scale war. The scenario provided 
conditions that could open the possibility of unification, and the ROK team was eager to 
take advantage.  
 
Yet, the ROK team, moving in the direction of reunification by force, did not 
fully anticipate opposition from Japan and the United States. The Japanese team worried 
that conflict might escalate and embroil Japan and the US team clearly prioritized a 
strategy of maintaining a balance of power and regional stability in Asia by preventing 
the further escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. As such, the exercise 
realistically captured the conflictual nature of US-ROK-Japan trilateralism and each 
country’s approach to dealing with the existential threat North Korea poses. 
 
While the main discussion within the ROK team focused on further military 
action, a diplomatic strategy was not analyzed sufficiently as an alternative approach to 
resolve the volatile situation more peacefully. While the TTX assumed North Korea 
would threaten to use nuclear weapons, the possibility of North Korea resorting to a mere 
‘threat’ and rather than actual ‘use’ should have been differentiated. Military retaliation 
or countermeasures should have been accompanied by – or come after – requests for 
hostage release negotiations. As a redrawing of the Northern Limit Line was North 
Korea’s (ostensible) reason for the assault, the ROK government would have likely 
needed to include that on any negotiation agenda. Unless Pyongyang was preparing to 
rush into an all-out war or to use a nuclear weapon regardless of Seoul’s response, the 
ROK would have gained time by requesting negotiation. In this time, Seoul could find a 
better solution, or buy time to prepare its forces for the next stage. Negotiations would 
also help cool public opinion in Seoul.  
 
The ROK team should have better anticipated the negative reactions from the US 
and Japan to its decision and strategized better to persuade them in a systematic way, 
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instead of emphasizing the ROK team’s unilateral desire to achieve unification by force. 
When the ROK team proposed its political decision, it would have been better if it were 
accompanied by research studies on post-reunification plans for reconstruction, 
education, and the economy. This, in part, could have helped support Seoul’s strategic 
thinking and ease some of the Japanese and US teams’ concerns. Moreover, besides 
listing its own benefits, the ROK team should have clarified mutual benefits to Japan and 
the US that may result from Korean reunification in order to receive support. For 
instance, the ROK team could have talked up the important role a united Korea could 
play in the Obama administration’s grand strategy of the rebalance to Asia. Likewise, the 
ROK team should have considered its approach more carefully in dealing with Japan, 
such as trade benefits, to move the decision forward. 
 
The different reactions and solutions suggested by the three countries toward 
North Korea’s provocation, as outlined in the TTX scenario, portray the present realities 
of trilateral cooperation. Before pushing political and military cooperation, the United 
States, ROK, and Japan should have found more opportunities to discuss trilateral issues 
and develop a better understanding of each country’s goals. During the TTX there was a 
gap between the three governments’ interpretation of Pyongyang’s intent—a full-scale 
war or limited military response. In this context, consensus on operational cooperation 
between the three countries is required for clearer standards and language for various 
conflict scenarios. As briefly mentioned at the TTX, Washington’s current bilateral 
relationships with ROK and Japan can be a baseline for a future trilateral cooperative 
mechanism. By examining the existing practice of bilateral relationships, the three 
countries can build clear and consistent policy responses against the common challenges 
they are facing, such as North Korea’s nuclear program and threats in the cyber domain. 
 
During the TTX, uncertainty emerged as a significant challenge in the security 
environment, just as it was portrayed during the Cheonan incident of 2010. Because 
North Korea denied responsibility for both the Cheonan and Sony Pictures attacks, it 
takes time to investigate problems, to assess damage, and share conclusive evidence with 
allies. The so-called gray area of coercion issue thus adds difficulties as time can escalate 
a crisis and destabilize trilateral cooperation. Therefore, the establishment of an effective 
information-sharing channel should be developed between the three countries, something 
that was not really discussed during the exercise.  
 
In conclusion, the policymakers of the three countries need to develop a robust 
and cohesive mechanism for a wide range of contingency scenarios that can threaten the 
security environment in the region. While each government can have its own national 
interest in the same contingency situation, a clear framework can deter potential security 
threats to the region by ensuing timely and proportionate responses. The three countries 
met in trilateral and multilateral settings for the past few years but bilateral meetings 
between ROK and Japan have not been frequent. These can be an opportunity to discuss 
sensitive issues that are vital for trilateral cooperation and build trust, which is a starting 
point for the three governments to take action together during a time of crisis.   
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Table Top Exercise: Japan Team 
Tomoko Kiyota, Tomohiro Tanaka, Takashi Yoshida, 
Yoko Mori, Akira Igata, and Masashi Murano 
 
The Table-Top Exercise (TTX) was analyzed, focusing on four points; (1) how 
the TTX captured the reality of a potential crisis; (2) whether particular capabilities were 
missing through the exercise; (3) diplomatic and political action that should have been 
considered during the exercise; and (4) measures to reduce the risk of a potential crisis.  
 
 Addressing three points would have clarified Japan’s responses in the TTX. First, 
the Japan team needed more information on the nature of the nuclear explosion in the Sea 
of Japan. For example, if information of the explosion came from the US government, 
then the participants should have been able to determine if the nuclear device was 
delivered via missile (through surveillance). In contrast, if the information came through 
the CTBT surveillance network (detection of unnatural explosion) and the MD system 
didn’t detect a firing of missiles, then the participants could have concluded that this was 
a suicidal dirty bomb explosion of a ship (or something similar). This information would 
be critical for the Japan team’s discussion. The key discussion point for the Japan team in 
step 2 of the simulation was whether the nuclear explosion constituted an “attack on 
Japan.” This interpretation hinged on whether the nuclear explosion was a suicidal dirty 
bomb explosion of a ship or from a nuclear-tipped missile. Thus, if this information had 
been provided, Japan’s response would have been clearer. In other words, if the explosion 
was due to a nuclear-tipped missile, then the Japanese government would infer the 
intention of North Korea to be much more hostile. A nuclear-tipped missile launched 
toward Japan can be interpreted as at best a clear case of nuclear blackmail against Japan 
and at worst as a failed nuclear missile attack against Japanese territory. Either way, 
Japan can interpret the situation as North Korea breaking the nuclear taboo of no use of 
nuclear weapons that has lasted for 70 years. On the other hand, if the explosion was a 
suicidal dirty bomb, then the situation is more ambiguous. The former case would have 
enabled Japan to act in self-defense, whereas the latter case would have led to the 
restrained actions taken by Japan in the simulation. Second, the scenario should have 
anticipated a situation in which Japan’s new security bills passed the Diet. The Japan 
team analyzed the situation under the current legislation; new security bills would have 
provided us with broader sets of options. In addition, there is concern about the new 
security bills in the ROK. If the TTX demonstrated how the new security bills would 
work, it would have helped eliminate such concerns among ROK participants. Third, the 
discussion lacked analysis of China’s responses. In a real contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula, China’s actions would have huge implications. Hence, even though the 
discussion focused on trilateral security cooperation, participation of Chinese experts 
would have made the simulation more dynamic. 
 
 Issues related to the use of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and the Coast 
Guard was one of the primary focuses in the Japan team’s breakout session, so all 
relevant defense resources seem to have been put to use in Japan’s response. However, 
there are alternative ways to interpret the situation in the scenario that determine how 
much of these defense capabilities Japan can legally use, such as whether the nuclear 
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detonation constitutes an attack against Japan. During the discussion, the initial reaction 
to the nuclear explosion was that if dispersing radioactive materials constitutes an attack 
against a country, then nuclear power plant accidents – like the one in Fukushima – could 
be interpreted as such as well, so a nuclear explosion outside of the territorial Sea of 
Japan would not constitute an attack on Japan. However, it would have been possible to 
argue that since JSDF assets have already been deployed in the Sea of Japan, a nuclear 
explosion in the Sea of Japan by North Korea was intended to and has the potential to 
harm JSDF personnel, so this nuclear detonation constitutes an attack against Japan. If 
the situation was interpreted this way, broader sets of capabilities to react to the situation 
could have been considered.  
 
 The importance of diplomatic initiatives was largely missing in the main 
discussion. Yet, under the current security legislation, the military options Japan can take 
are very limited so Japan should be as active politically as possible.  The Japan team 
should have identified more specific ways to bring China and Russia on board to pressure 
North Korea from further escalating the situation. For example, through channels such as 
bilateral, Six-Party-Talks-like framework, and the United Nation’s Security Council, 
Japan could encourage China and Russia to pressure North Korea to keep it from 
escalating.  
 
 To reduce the risk of a crisis, policymakers in Japan should consider the following 
actions now. First, they should continue to closely coordinate with countries concerned 
including the US, the ROK, China, and Russia in urging North Korea to refrain from any 
further provocation and to take concrete actions toward denuclearization and other goals 
in compliance with the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement and relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions. Second, establishing and administering an intelligence-sharing mechanism 
(GSOMIA) with the ROK will be critical in dealing with crises. This would not only be 
helpful when a North Korean contingency occurs, but better preparation for these crises 
would also reduce the risk of a crisis by sending North Korea the message that the three 
countries are ready to deal with whatever action North Korea would take, thus deterring 
North Korea from moving up the escalation ladder. Third, there should be a joint 
operation plan of Japan-US-ROK for a Korean Peninsula contingency. That is, OPLAN 
5027 should be shared with Japan. This will better prepare the three countries for a crisis.  
 
In addition, policymakers should do a crisis simulation such as this TTX with 
allies. The Maui TTX revealed key questions regarding Japan’s responses to a crisis; 
would the ROK bypass Japan in making its decisions vis-à-vis China? What would the 
ROK demand the US do? Would the ROK give Japan information? If so, which 
organization would be the principle counterpart on the ROK side? What would ROK 
want from Japan? Will the ROK accept Japan’s request for Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO)? Answering these questions would help policymakers clarify what 
each country wants and expects from the others, clarify who their primary counterparts 
would be in what situation, help determine what would be acceptable actions and what 
would be sensitive. Fourth, the policymakers should establish measures to avoid 
misunderstanding or miscalculation in a crisis. In particular, they should establish a 
confidence-building mechanism with neighboring countries, including China, at the 
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Track 1.5 level. In such meetings, concerned countries can share a concept and definition 
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US-ROK-Japan Tabletop Exercise 




 It is mid-September, 2015. While there has been little concrete progress in bilateral 
military cooperation, South Korea and Japan have scheduled for November their first level-
leader summit since President Park and Prime Minister Abe each took office. The summit 
reflects negotiations throughout the summer over issues such as the comfort women and the 
content of Prime Minister Abe’s speech to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of 
World War II. That statement was condemned by North Korea, and Pyongyang slammed the 
government of ROK President Park for “abandoning the interests of Koreans” and “bending 
to the will of her imperialist masters, the United States.”  
 
 China has halted land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, declaring that it 
had completed all planned projects. The US and other nations have denounced those efforts 
and Washington announced that it would send air and sea patrols to assert freedom of 
navigation through contested waters. China has stepped up patrols near the disputed 
Senkaku/Daioyu islands. In Europe, Greece continues to have difficulties implementing the 
repayment plan and “Grexit” remains a real possibility. The Minsk 2 ceasefire has broken 
down, and there is open skirmishing between Ukrainian forces and separatist rebels. Moscow 
continues to deny official Russian involvement in the fighting, but it is confirmed by 
independent observers. Russia has moved heavy equipment to the border with Ukraine and 
has warned the West that active engagement by NATO would trigger a similar response by 
its military. 
 
 Unrest in Europe has unsettled global financial markets. A plunge in the Nikkei has 
forced the Abe government to focus on economic policy. This reorientation and high levels 
of disapproval of legislation to permit the exercise of the right of collective self-defense 




 Under cover of night, North Korean amphibious forces assault Daechong, a small 
island 4.88 sq miles in size that is 12 mi from the coast of North Korea. It has a population of 
just over 1,200, with an additional 1,000 soldiers, primarily doing intelligence work. ROK 
defenses are overrun. The Pyongyang leadership calls the attack “the liberation of occupied 
territory, unjustly taken from the North by the so-called armistice authorities,” and a 
redrawing of the maritime boundary that divides the two countries. As the attack was 
occurring, there was a massive cyberattack on ROK government computer networks, media 
and financial institutions.  It is now 8 AM on the following morning; information regarding 
casualties is unreliable but it is clear that some ROK citizens died and all remaining on the 







1. What are your government’s five goals, in descending order of priority, in this 
situation?  
2. What are the five immediate military steps your government takes to respond? 
3. What five things do you expect each of the other two countries to say or do?  
4. What do you not want each of the other two countries to say or do?  
 
Step 2  
 
 It is 24 hours later. Preliminary and unverifiable information indicates that about half 
the ROK forces were killed and the other half wounded and captured. Virtually all island 
civilians were taken hostage. The ROK demands that North Korean forces abandon the 
island, return all hostages, both civilian and military or face massive retaliation. North Korea 
responds that the ROK must now abandon the island of Baengnyeongdo which is nearby and 
vulnerable. If Seoul does not withdraw from the island, Pyongyang is prepared to use a 
device that will render it uninhabitable as a demonstration of its determination, its strength 
and its commitment to redrawing the Northern Limit Line. Pyongyang also tells Seoul that it 
will never return Daechong; one way or another it will be North Korean territory. After 
dispersing road mobile missiles, the National Defense Commission, led by First Chairman 
Kim Jung Un, tells Japan that it is “prepared to use every tool in its newly modernized 
arsenal” if Tokyo should aid South Korea in any way.  
 
 The United Nations Security Council has convened and there are preliminary 
indications that Moscow and Beijing are not prepared to punish Pyongyang for actions that 
“right historical wrongs.” 
 
Questions:  
1. Does step two change any of your answers to question 1 in the previous step? 
2. What are the five immediate steps your government takes to respond? 
3. What five things do you expect each of the other two countries to say or do?  
4. What do you not want each of the other two countries to say or do?  
 
 One hour into the discussion, it was announced that North Korea had detonated a 
nuclear device in the Sea of Japan. There were no reports of casualties or any additional 
information about the type of explosion or explanation for why the blast occurred. 
 
   
 
 
